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ARTICLES
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE MONTANA UNIVERSITY
SYSTEM UNDER THE NEW MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Hugh V. Schaefer*
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the impact of Article X of the New Montana
Constitution on the legal status of higher education in Montana. In
order to facilitate analysis the article is divided into parts. Part 1 gives
a brief comparison between Article XI of the "old" and Article X of
the "new" constitution. The discussion in Part 1 dwells primarily on
the changes in language between the two articles as well as an overview
of the most obvious or literal changes in the structure of higher edu-
cation by the adoption of the new Montana Constitution. Part 2 is a
review of the preconvention debate over the appropriate status that
should be accorded higher education in Montana by a new constitution.
Part 3 analyzes the debate over the education article in the constitutional
convention as it related to higher education with a view towards de-
veloping an understanding of the intent in proposing Article X to the
citizens of Montana for adoption. Part 4 is an analysis of decisions
from jurisdictions whose constitutions most closely parallel Montana on
the status of higher education with special emphasis on the interrelation
of higher education with other branches of state government. The
article concludes with findings.'
The degree of recognition of higher education in state government
in the United States has been debated extensively throughout the history
of this nation. Unfortunately, the exact legal status accorded higher
education has not been consistent or uniform. The spectrum of the
variations in this status range from total and complete dependence
of higher education on the legislative assembly or the executive in some
states to virtual autonomy tantamount to making higher education a
so-called "fourth branch" of state government in other states. The type
of entity that controls higher education in the various states is equally
varied. Single state superintendents, public corporations, public trusts,
boards or commissions, appointed by either governors, legislatures or
elected by the people exist today with varying degrees of autonomy
throughout the fifty states. Perhaps the reason for such variance may
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana. A.B.
University of Notre Dame, 1955; J.D., University of Tulsa, 1961.
1This article is based upon research done by the writer for the Board of Regents of
Higher Education and the Honorable Lawrence K. Pettit, Commissioner of Higher
Education. Any views and opinions expressed herein are those of the writer and do
not necessarily reflect the position or view of the Board of Regents, its members,
or the Commissioner.
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be that higher education involves a substantial portion of state revenues
and expenditures and as in other areas of state government, the wisest
way to insure responsibility for these funds is an ongoing process of
constant change.
The exact legal status with which to clothe higher education in
Montana was debated extensively and thoroughly in the sessions of the
recent Montana Constitutional Convention. That substantial and far
reaching changes were intended is evident even from a casual com-
parison between the old and the new constitution. The debate in the
Montana Constitutional Convention reflected the ongoing national de-
bate over the structure of higher education in America educational
history.
PART 1
The old Montana Constitution Art. XI, § 11 provided as follows:
The general control and supervision of the state university and the
various other state educational institutions shall be vested in a state
board of education, whose powers and duties shall be prescribed
and regulated by law.. I
The new Constitution Art. X, § 9 provides:
(1) There is a state board of education composed of the board of
regents of higher education and the board of public education. It
is responsible for long-range planning, and for coordinating and
evaluating policies and programs for the state's educational systems.
It shall submit unified budget requests. A tie vote at any meeting
may be broken by the governor, who is an ex officio member of
each component board.
(2) (a) The government and control of the Montana university
system is vested in a board of regents of higher education which
shall have full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise,
coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system and
shall supervise and coordinate other public educational institutions
assigned by law.
(b) The board consists of seven members appointed by the governor,
and confirmed by the senate, to overlapping terms, as provided by
law. The governor and superintendent of public instruction are ex
officio nonvoting members of the board.(c) The board shall appoint a commissioner of higher education and
prescribe his term and duties.
(d) The funds and appropriations under the control of the board
of regents are subject to the same audit provisions as are all other
state funds.
(3) (a) There is a board of public education to exercise general
supervision over the public school system and such other public
educational institutions as may be assigned by law. Other duties of
the board shall be provided by law.
(b) The board consists of seven members appointed by the gov-
ernor, and confirmed by the senate, to overlapping terms as pro-
vided by law. The governor, commissioner of higher education and
state superintendent of public instruction shall be ex officio nonvot-
ing members of the board
The most obvious change brought about by the new Constitution
is the creation of separate boards, one for the control of higher edu-
MONT. CONST. art. XII § 11 (1889).
MONT. CONST. art. IX (1972).
[Vol. 35
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cation and the other for the control of elementary and secondary edu-
cation. Both boards together comprise a "super board" of education
with limited functions. This state board of education is required to act
as a budget-clearinghouse for all educational budgets in the state as
well as coordinating and planning educational policies for the state. The
old board of education had responsibility for both the public school
system and the higher education system known as the Montana uni-
versity system. This latter function was conferred upon the state board
by the Legislature in 1971. 4
Under the new Constitution, however, the board of regents for the
Montana university system has been transformed from a purely legis-
lative creation to a constitutional department. This transformation of
the status of the board of regents represents another and perhaps the
most significant change in the structure and control of higher educa-
tion in the state. Under the old constitution the board of education,
although a constitutional entity, nevertheless was completely dependent
upon the legislature for its powers and duties. Until the legislature
passed laws which implemented the constitutional mandate, the board
was virtually powerless.
In an early decision the Montana Supreme Court ruled that the
constitution reserved broad powers to the legislature and its control
was superior and illimitable as long as it did not infringe upon the
constitution.5 The court further declared in that case, that the state
board of education, because of its dependence on the legislature, was
simply just another agency of state government and a part of the execu-
tive department.6 In examining corresponding language in the new con-
stitution with regard to the power and duties of the board of regents,
the language of the old constitution subjecting their definition to legis-
lative control is no longer present. "Full power of responsibility and
authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control ... " is vested in
the board of regents.7
The full legal effect of such language will be dealt with in more
detail later in this article, but it seems evident even from the briefest
reading that the function of defining powers and duties of the board
has shifted from one of absolute legislative prerogative to that of the
board limited only by the express language of the constitution and rea-
sonable interpretations that common understanding would infer from
such language. Under the new constitution the role of the legislature
in higher education has been narrowed from one of defining all powers
and duties of the board to only the functions of appropriation, audit,
setting by statute the terms of office of members of the board and
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 75-8501 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
'State ex rel. Pub. Svc. Comm. v. Brannon et al, 86 Mont. 200, 283 P. 202 (1929).
6Id. at 208.
7See note 3, supra.
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assigning additional educational institutions to the control of the board.
The senate has the added but exclusive function of confirming guber-
national appointments to the board."
Further evidence of the intent of the framers of the constitution
as to who has what powers and duties is found when the provisions of
Art. X § 9 dealing with the board of regents are contrasted with other
provisions of Art. X § 9 dealing with the powers and duties of the state
board of public education. In Art. X § 9 (3) (a) there is the express
provision that while general supervision over the public school system
rests in that board, the legislature has the prerogative to provide other
duties to the board. No such language is found in any of the provisions
dealing with the board of regents.
Other significant differences between the old and new provisions
include giving the board of regents the power to appoint a commissioner
of higher education and the power and duty to define his term and
duties. This power was actually part of legislative control under the
old constitution, but was delegated to the board of education by
legislative enactment." The new post of commissioner of higher edu-
cation succeeds the office of executive secretary under former legis-
lation. While the governor and superintendent of public instruction
remain ex officio members of each component board, the attorney gen-
eral is no longer an ex officio member of either board under the new
constitution. However, the function of the governor is limited to making
appointment to both boards with senate approval, for terms prescribed
by law. The governor has the prerogative to vote to break a tie vote
at a meeting of the state board of education. Article X of the new con-
stitution is silent as to who presides over the meetings of either board
of the state board of education. However, for reasons which will be
discussed later, the power to elect its own chairman is inherent in the
type of board that the new constitution has created as a necessary and
proper function to be implied from the powers assigned to the board by
the constitution.
The new constitution does not expressly place the board of regents
under any branch of state government for administrative purposes.
However, this matter was treated at some length in the Montana Con-
stitutional Convention and has received judicial scrutiny in other juris-
dictions. Parts 3 and 4 of this report will include a discussion of this
question. Merely contrasting language distinctions may resolve general
differences between the old and the new constitutions, but the overall
inquiry must resolve the fundamental and basic question raised by the
debate over the legal status of higher education. Simply stated this
question is: How independent is the board of regents? As stated above
this issue has been subjected to judicial scrutiny and was fully debated
8MONT. CONST. art. X, § 9(2)(a) and (b).
'R.C.M. 1947, § 75-8501.
[Vol. 35
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in the Constitutional Convention of 1972. As a matter of fact many
theories about the structure of higher education and its treatment under
the new constitution were offered in advance of the convention. The
next part of this report is a brief resume of these proposals to provide
historical depth to the inquiry.
PART 2
In 1968 the Montana Legislative Council prepared a report on the
need for a constitution convention to repeal the old constitution. ° In
discussing Art. XI of the old constitution the council recommended that
the new constitution repeal Art. XI in its entirety and replace it by
statute, if necessary." The effect of such recommendation if adopted
would be essentially a retention of the status quo under the old con-
stitution. This proposal was advanced apparently after the legislative
council had received the so-called "Durham report" which was prepared
for the council also in 1968.12 The Durham report recommended that
there should be a separate and independent board of regents for higher
education constituted as a "body corporate and politic and its estab-
lishment, with all the rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments
heretofore granted or conferred are hereby perpetuated" unto it under
the general control and supervision of the regents. 18 The Durham pro-
posal received consideration by the education committee of the conven-
tion but it did not adopt it per se.
In his article appearing in the Winter 1972 issue of the Montana
Law Review 14 Lawrence R. Waldoch offered a proposal for a constitu-
tional article on education. In essence the proposal would have vested
"governmental control of academic, financial and administrative affairs
of the University of Montana System" in a board of regents with the
duty to govern the same as a "public trust in a manner consistent with
the general laws of Montana. The legislature shall pass no law which
infringes upon, diminishes or transfers to another body any of the au-
thority provided by this section."' 5 This proposal was considered by the
education committee but it was not adopted per se. The final pre-
convention proposal was contained in a legal research report prepared
by three law students at the University of Montana which recommended
lOLegislative Council Report on the Montana Constitution, Report No. 6 of the Mon-
tana Constitutional Convention Commission at p. 55; contained in Montana Consti-
tutional Convention occasional papers. (Unpublished reports of the Convention will
hereinafter be abbreviated; for example: Legis. C. Rept. Mont. Const., Rept. No. 6.
Const. Cony. Comm., Mont. Const. Cony. oce. papers.)
"Rept. Ed. Comm., Mont. Const. Cony., Const. Conv. Study No. 17, Mont. Const. Cony.
Comm., Ch. VIII, p. 15.
24Waldoch, Constitutional Control of the Montana University System: A Proposed
Bevision, 33 MONT. L. REv. 76 (1972).
uId. at 95.
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that the Constitutional Convention provide for a board of regents as a
body corporate vested with the exclusive management and control of
the Montana University System.16
After reviewing these proposals and hearing the testimony of 100
witnesses, the majority of the committee proposed the following pro-
vision, inter alia, to the convention:
There shall be a board of regents of higher education, a body
corporate, which shall govern and control the academic, financial
and administrative affairs of the Montana University System.'
While the foregoing provision was contained in a majority report, the
minority report limited its report to matters not germane to this inquiry
and offered no minority proposal regarding the structure of the board
of regents.' s Therefore, the foregoing provision was a unanimous pro-
posal of the committee to the convention. After the report reached the
floor of the Constitutional Convention various amendments were offered
which changed the language of the majority proposal.
The Convention debate over the education article provides a source
from which to determine the intent of the framers of the new con-
stitution. The following part of this report is a discussion of some of
the significant arguments raised during the convention concerning the
status of the board of regent under the constitution. Part 3 will con-
centrate primarily on a discussion of the significant amendments and
motions that were offered rather than the many random comments which
were often made. This direction is preferable since the ensuing votes
of the delegates affords concrete evidnee of the will of the Convention.
However, selection of these passages was done only after a reading and
analysis of the entire transcript of the Convention debate on the edu-
cation article.
PART 3
At the time the majority report of the education and public lands
committee of the Convention was introduced the tone of the report was
established by the remarks of its Chairman, Delegate Champous: He
stated that direct legislative control under the old system had proven
unworkable. 19 "There was a need for autonomy and relief from state
administrative bureaucracy. '20 He further stated that higher education
must be something more than simply another state service.21
1"Rpt. Ed. Comm., Mont. Const. Cony., Const. Conv. Study No. 17, supra note 13 at
p. 17.
27Id.
laId.
la(In the ensuing discussion references to the transcript of the record of the conven-
tion proceedings will be given in abbreviated form as to volume and page as follows:
TR. Vol ......... P ........ ) Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 6268.
2TR. Vol. VIII, pp. 6285-6289.
2TR. Vol. VIII, p. 6283.
[Vol. 35
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During the course of the debate numerous amendments to the
majority report were offered which suggested a retention of the old
structure for higher education. These include a proposal which essen-
tially vested control of the higher education system in a commissioner
of education whose duties would be prescribed by law.22 This amend-
ment was later withdrawn by its proponent. 23 Then an amendment pro-
posed that the general control and supervision of the state university be
vested in a state board of education whose powers and duties will be
prescribed and regulated by law. 24 During the debate on this amend-
ment another amendment was offered which was basically similar to the
one pending except as to the manner of appointment.25  The latter
amendment was defeated by a roll call vote 66-29;26 the former was also
defeated by roll call vote 54-38.27 Later on in the debate another amend-
ment was offered which proposed to place the general control and super-
vision of the state university and various other state educational institu-
tions in the superintendent of schools and one or more state boards of
education whose duties shall be prescribed and regulated by law.28 This
amendment was defeated by roll call vote 59-34.29 Another amendment
proposing that administrative responsibilities of the board of regents
be placed in the board of education 30 was likewise defeated by roll call
vote, 66-18. 31
At this juncture it is clear that the will of the convention was to
change substantially the legal structure of higher education in Montana
as it then existed. The majority report proposed a new degree of inde-
pendence for the board of regents so as to free the board from exces-
sive legislative control. The debate in the convention then turned to the
degree of independence the board should have. Throughout the debate
the delegates recognized that the board's activities would involve three
general areas, academic, financial and administrative. Extensive discus-
sion occurred as to whether all of these functions should be entrusted to
the board or be regulated by law. Various amendments were offered
in an attempt to either narrow, limit or change legal responsibility for
these functions.
To place this aspect of the convention debate in perspective it is
necessary to consider an amendment to the majority report which was
passed by the convention. This amendment changed the majority pro-
2TR. Vol. VIII, p. 6298.
2TR. Vol. VIII, p. 6300.
21TR. Vol. VIII, p. 6301.
2TR. Vol. VIII, p. 6313.
2TR. Vol. VIII, p. 6374.
2'TR. Vol. VIII, p. 6380.
OTR. Vol. IX, p. 6641.
-TR. Vol. IX, p. 6643.
*TR. Vol. IX, p. 6643.
BmTR. Vol. IX, p. 6649.
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posal to provide that the "Regents shall have full power, responsibility
and authority to supervise, manage and control the University System.132
The word "coordinate" was inserted after the word "supervise" by a
voice vote of the convention. 3 Thereupon the [above] amendment was
passed by a roll call vote of the convention 82-14.34 Two amendments
were subsequently offered purporting to vest in the legislature control
over some of the functions of the board. One amendment proposed that
"powers and duties over financial affairs be regulated by law, the regents
to have control over the administrative and academic functions." 35 This
proposal was defeated by a roll call vote of the convention 52-40.36
Thereupon another amendment was offered limiting the power of the
board of regents to academic matters only, financial and administrative
powers to be prescribed by law.3 7 This amendment was defeated by roll
call vote 58-33.-3
These amendments were offered near the close of the convention
debate on education and culminated a lengthy floor debate on the rela-
tionship of the board of regents to other areas of state government.
The rejection of these amendments indicates that the majority of the
delegates intended that the board of regents should no longer be depend-
ent upon the legislature for the definition of their power and duties and
no longer subject to various administrative and executive departments
of state government. The debate leading to the rejection of the last two
amendments produced very few formal motions or amendments but those
delegates who spoke against them specifically mentioned that the ma-
jority report sought to make the board of regents autonomous from ad-
ministrative regulations and procedures that apply to other state de-
partments. The majority report stated that this would be insured by
making the board of regents a constitutional department of the state,
free from the power of the legislature to prescribe its power and
duties.39
To complete the picture of this phase of the convention debate
over the relationship of the board to other departments of state govern-
ment certain other amendments that were offered should be discussed.
The convention approved by voice vote an amendment which in effect
MTR. Vol. IX, p. 6480.
31TR. Vol. IX, p. 6498.
8TR. Vol. IX, p. 6532.
1TR. Vol. IX, p. 6532.
M1TR. Vol. IX, p. 6544.
8TR. Vol. IX, p. 6545.
TR. Vol. IX, p. 6553.
8To give some examples of the probable intent of the convention with respect to the
degree of independence that the delegates felt the board should have, the following
statements were made during the sessions involving the education article. It is im-
portant to note, however, that these references were not amendments or motions but
only explanations, discussions, and clarifying statements made by the delegrates pro
and con as to the majority report and amendments offered thereto.
[Vol. 35
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subjected the board of regents to both legislative as well as executive
audit of their funds.40 As mentioned above however, the record indicates
that no pre-audit was intended by the adoption of this amendment.41
Another amendment was offered proposing to insert the word "account-
ing" before the "audit. '42 The stated purpose of this amendment was to
place the board under a unified or statewide governmental accounting
system applicable to other departments or agencies. After substantial
debate the proposal was defeated by roll call vote 52-40. 43 Those who
spoke in opposition to this proposal stated that it would erode and
hamper the power of the board to govern itself and to determine the
policies and procedures which work best for it.44
Two other matters which occurred during the convention debate
should be noted. The words "body corporate" were deleted from the
majority proposal.45 This phrase was deleted from the majority proposal
at the time an amendment vesting the board of regents with full power,
responsibility and authority to supervise, manage and control the Uni-
versity System was offered.46 In the debate that followed, the deletion
of the words "body corporate" was necessary so that the board could
not escape audit of their expenditures. 47 Those who favored the use of
ITEM:
1.) Governor nonvoting member of both boards. Power of
appointment of board members only:
2.) Governor to receive unified budget of entire state
education system:
3.) Board not subject to architectural supervision by state
architect and state board of examiners:
4.) Board of Regents has power to eliminate intraunit
competition for courses:
5.) Budgets not subject to review by State Department
of Administration:
6.) Units of the University system must submit budgets to
the Board of Regents who will in term submit to Board
of Education for review and approval and submission
by the latter to the governor and the legislature:
7.) Board not subject to state budget director or De-
partment of Administration:
8.) No executive department power over expenditures:
9.) No pre-audit of expenditures:
10.) No intention to establish a separate branch of state
government:
11.) Board must be relatively independent from executive
branch of government:
12.) Board must administer its own affairs and will not
be subject to state purchasing agent unless the board
chooses to be:
13.) Board not subject to internal accounting procedures
established by State Department of Administration:
"TR. Vol. IX, p. 6499.
"Supra note 39, item 9.
"OTR. Vol. XI, p. 7868.
"TR. Vol. XI, p. 7917.
"TR. Vol. XI, pp. 7870-7906.
ITB. Vol. IX, p. 6480.
"TR. Vol. IX, p. 6486.
"TR. Vol. IX, p. 6481.
T :
Vol. VIII, p. 6324.
Vol. VIII, p. 6324.
Vol. VIII, pp. 6326-6328.
Vol. VIII, p. 6355.
Vol. VIII, pp. 6388-6390.
Vol. VIII, p. 6392.
Vol. IX, pp. 6491-6492.
Vol. IX, p. 6501.
Vol. IX, pp. 6502-6506.
Vol. IX, p. 6509.
Vol. IX, p. 6515.
Vol. IX, pp. 6541-6544.
Vol. IX, p. 7871.
1974]
9
Schaefer: The Legal Status Of The Montana University System Under The New Montana Constitution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1974
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
these words conceded that they were not necessary since the amendment
offered would still guarantee the autonomy that the board should have
saved for the audit requirements.4 8 Elsewhere it was stated that the
use of these words was copied from the Michigan Constitution and the
Michigan system was what the majority report was seeking.4 9
Also there was discussion in the record about an unsigned letter
which had been circulated on the floor of the convention on letterhead
of the State Department of Administration urging the delegates not to
accept the majority report since if adopted, it would confer too much
autonomy in the board of regents.50 No specific action was taken with
regard to the letter, but it was discussed by the delegates. Finally, the
delegates discussed the fact that the "power of the purse" plus audit
was the only control that they intended the legislature to have over
their appropriations for education. Since the legislature has constitutional
control over state funds, it should be necessary for the board to draw
these funds through the state treasurer.51
To briefly summarize it seems that the convention intended that the
board of regents should be a quasi-independent state department subject
only to indirect legislative control through appropriation, audit, con-
firmation of gubernatorial appointments and assignment of other edu-
cational institutions for their supervision. The executive branch would
likewise indirectly control the board only through the power of appoint-
ment of its members, and the ex officio membership of the governor
on the board. Since the constitution requires the governor to submit a
budget of proposed revenues and expenditures of the state52 the board
of education would be obligated to submit its budget for all education
in the state to the governor as well as to the legislature. Furthermore,
§ 15 of the article empowers the governor to request and obtain infor-
mation in writing under oath from all officers and managers of state
institutions.55
Of course, this inquiry would not be complete without an analysis
of important judicial decisions from Montana and other jurisdictions
which have interpreted similar language to determine the power and
authority of the various boards charged with the responsibility of ad-
ministering higher education in the United States. The next part of this
report will explore the most significant decisions.
PART 4
The litigation that has occurred over the issue of the degree of
autonomy contained in constitutional and legislative enactments has
18TR. Vol. VlhI,p. 6355.
"TR. Vol. IX, p. 6473.
WTR. Vol. VIII, p. 6289.
t TR. Vol. VIII, p. 6291.
52MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
13M. art. VI, § 15.
[Vol. 35
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been voluminous. In the interest of economy and relevancy this discus-
sion will explore cases from those jurisdictions which have constitutional
provisions on education parallel or similar to Montana. Those states
which expressly and entirely relegate the board to a mere creature of
statute or expressly subject it to a specific executive department will
be discussed only briefly.
At the outset it should be stated that a reading of significant de-
cisions of all fifty states indicates that Montana's new constitution has
made the board of regents virtually autonomous subject only to the
express proscriptions contained in the constitution itself as stated above.
4
The decisions which were reviewed interpreted language basically sim-
ilar to the Montana Constitution and reached conclusions consistently
favoring autonomy from state legislative and executive control and
supervision. 55
In California, the state supreme court has ruled that the legislature
is prohibited by the constitution from dictating the form and character
of the Hastings College of Law as this is the sole and exclusive pre-
rogative of the regents. 56 In 1913 a California appellate court ruled that
"Id. art. IX.
'Only one state, Utah, appears to insist on legislative control despite language in its
constitution appearing to favor autonomy for its Board of Regents. In University
of Utah v. Board of Examiners of State, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348 (1956), the
Utah Supreme Court found the relevant constitutional provisions to be ambiguous
and not clearly vesting the University with the autonomy it thought it possessed.
The University sought to be relieved from certain procedural restrictions on ex-
penditures which the Utah state board of examiners had imposed on all state agen-
cies. In its argument to the Utah Supreme Court, counsel for the University of Utah
urged the court to follow the decisions of several other states granting constitu-
tional autonomy to higher education because of the similarity of language between
Utah's Constitution and those of these other states. The Utah Supreme Court, how-
ever, found that the Utah Constitution merely confirmed what the territorial legis-
lature had done under the Utah Organic Act in establishing a university "subject
to the territorial legislature." Id. at 351. (Emphasis supplied.) The court stated
that the Constitution of Utah did not specifically declare that the University of
Utah should be vested with the control and management of the University as was
specifically done in each of the constitutions of the states to which the University
was seeking a favorable comparison, Id. at 358-359, or at least the Utah Constitution
was ambiguous as to whether the framers thereof intended such a degree of autonomy.
Where such ambiguity exists, the court said, then it was necessary to turn to Utah
history to determine this intent. The court stated that substantial legislation had
been enacted dealing with the University of Utah and to which there has been no
objection by the University for over 50 years and it was safe to infer that it was
understood by the citizens of Utah that the framers did not intend the same degree
of autonomy that the University now asserts it has. Id. at 362. This decision, while
a minority of one among the states providing for constitutional autonomy, neverthe-
less raises the question of whether autonomy can be lost by inaction after, or acquies-
cence in, unconstitutional legislation purporting to intervene in the prerogatives of a
constitutionally autonomous board of regents. This issue has never been raised in
these other states, but this is not to say that it could not possibly occur. In this
context it should be pointed out that the Montana Constitution does specifically vest
powers in the Board of Regents (see discussion under Part 4 hereof, infra.), and
hence Montana appears to differ from Utah on this point which was regarded by
the Utah Supreme Court as controlling. However, the Utah case seems to say that
language is one thing, actual practice could be another. This case, though only a
minority of one, nevertheless contains a clear warning that constitutional autonomy
is not free from erosion and eventual loss unless timely asserted by the board.
"People v. Kewin, 69 Cal. 215, 10 P. 393 (1886). 11
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legislative exemptions from state health standards did not apply to the
California University system.5 7 In the case of Hamilton v. Regents, the
California Supreme Court held that since the board of regents of Cali-
fornia held a constitutional grant of control, their rules and regulations
have the same power as law as long as they are concerned with Univer-
sity affairs. 8 As late as 1967, the autonomy of the board of regents
was confirmed in the case of Goldberg v. Regents which upheld the
board's suspension of students who violated university regulations gov-
erning demonstrations.59
The Georgia Constitution has language similar with the Montana
Constitution. It provides "there shall be a board of regents of the Uni-
versity system of Georgia and the government, control and management
of the University system of Georgia . shall be vested in said board of
regents .. ."0
The decision of the regents to operate a laundry facility on the
campus of one of the units of the University system over the objection
of a group of laundry and dry cleaning business operators was upheld
in Villyard et al v. Regents.6 The court said that the powers granted
the regents by the constitution are broad and it is necessary to look
for express limitations on that power rather than authority to do specific
acts.6
2
Louisiana, usually regarded as a state where higher education has
been subject to direct legislative control (because of special constitutional
provisions not found in Montana's constitution) recently litigated the
question of the power of the board of regents. The Louisiana Supreme
Court ruled that the legislature has no power to established limits on
fines for parking violations on the Baton Rouge campus of Louisiana
State University; this function was the sole prerogative of the board
of regents.63
The state of Michigan is generally regarded as having the most
autonomous system of higher education and it has undergone numerous
tests in the courts to define that autonomy. In a series of cases dating
back as far as 1856, the legislature attempted to establish a college of
homeopathic medicine. After numerous court battles, the issue was
resolved in favor of the regents in the leading American decision of
Sterling v. Board of Regents." The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that
-Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619, 138 P. 937 (1913).
-219 Cal. 663, 28 P.2d 355 (1934).
1248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
6GA. CONST., art. I, § 1, par. 3 (1945).
e204 Ga. 517, 50 S.E.2d 313 (1948).
aid. at 315.
"Board of Regents of L.S.U. v. Student Gov. Assoc. of L.S.U., 262 La. 849, 264
So.2d 916 (1973).
-110 Mich. 369, 69 N.W. 253 (1896).
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to give the legislature this power would impliedly authorize them to
dismember the institution at their will."" The court reaffirmed an earlier
decision which found that the board is a constitutional body charged
with the entire control of the University. 6 The court further stated
that since both the board of regents and the legislature derived their
power from the same supreme authority, the legislature is not in a
dominant position to the board. 67 To hold otherwise would reduce the
board to mere ministerial officers functioning only to execute the will
of the legislature.68 The court determined that the constitution does not
bear that construction. 9
In two very significant decisions, the power of the board of regents
to operate free of any restrictions attached by either the legislature or
the state auditor-general was confirmed. In the case of Board of Agricul-
ture v. Auditor-General70 the legislature attached a condition to its appro-
priation to Michigan A & M College that the expenditure of such funds
must be supervised by the state administrative board.7'1 The board
attempted to secure the funds free of such restriction but when the
state auditor-general refused to use the warrants the board of regents
filed suit. The Michigan Supreme Court ordered the auditor-general
to issue the warrants finding that the conditioning of the appropriation
was an unconstitutional incursion into the constitutional prerogative of
the board.72 In the case of Board of Regents v. Auditor-General the court
held that the auditor-general had no prerogative to question the pro-
priety of an expenditure after the board had authorized it.73 The court
stated that once the appropriation had been made and the expenditure
sanctioned the auditor-general could not question it.7
4
In 1972, the power of the board was interpreted in Sprik v. Regents.75
An intermediate court of appeals of Michigan upheld the power of the
board of regents to collect rent increases it imposed on student housing
and pay them over to a local school district in lieu of property taxes
even though the property was tax exempt because it was used for Uni-
versity purposes.7 6 Since this decision is only an intermediate appellate
decision, it should be observed with some reservation because of the
possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan. The decision
raises a serious question as to whether the regents have exceeded their
1Id. at 258.
RId. at 256.
91Id. at 257.
UId. at 258.
Id.
70226 Mich. 417, 197 N.W. 160 (1924).
nId.
"Id.
-167 Mich. 444, 132 N.W. 1037 (1911).
71Id.
7543 Mich. App. 178, 204 N.W.2d 62 (1972).
"Id.
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constitutional authority when they spend funds for what appears to
be a non-university purpose. However, the ease did cover some other
issues which appear consistent with earlier Michigan decisions concern-
ing the relationship between the board and the legislature. The court
held that funds generated from the internal operation of the University
were not subject to any legislative supervision whatsoever.77 The legis-
lature may condition its appropriations only to the extent that the con-
ditions in no way infringe upon the board's constitutional duties and
powers.7 8 Legislative conditioning may not in any way constitute an
attempt to manage the University. 9
The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Michigan recently held un-
constitutional an act of the Michigan legislature which: (1) prohibited
expenditures of state funds for instructors or students who had been
found guilty, either by the courts or school officials, of interfering with
university operations or damaging university property; (2) prohibited
letting of contracts by board of regents for construction of self-liquidat-
ing projects without just submitting a schedule for liquidation of debt
to appropriate legislative committee; (3) imposed minimum teaching
hours on each faculty member; (4) conditioned appropriation of public
funds on number of out-of-state students.80 The Michigan Court of
Appeals determined the legislation to be an unwarranted and constitu-
tionally impermissible intrusion by the legislature into the management
of internal affairs which is the sole prerogative of the board of regents
under the Michigan Constitution. The opinion reviewed every past
decision in Michigan dealing with the board of regents and determined
that these decision as well as the opinions of the state attorney general
clearly establish the independent authority of the state's universities to
be free from legislative interference in their operations."'
Numerous decisions in Minnesota have conferred autonomous status
on the board of regents. The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that
the board of regents is not a mere agency of the state and is not
subject to the administrative regulations of the state treasurer.8 2 In
State ex rel. University v. Chase, the court held that the regents are
exempt from a law subjecting state agencies to supervision and control
of expenditures by the state commission of administration and finance.8 3
The court specifically found that the power to control university finances
is really the power to dictate academic policy making a constitutionally
inferior agency the final arbitrator of university policy.8 4 In 1931, the
78Id.
,,gd.
8047 Mich. App. 23, 208 N.W.2d 871 (1973).
mlid. at 885-886.
82Gleason v. Univ. of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W. 650 (1908).
1175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951 (1928).
81!d. at 955.
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Minnesota Supreme Court held in the case of Fanning v. University of
Minnesota that the planning, financing and erection of a dormitory were
the sole prerogative of the board and did not need special legislative
approval.8 5
The case of State ex rel. Sholes v. University exempted the board
from the state administrative procedures act on the theory that the
board is something more than a mere administrative agency, its genesis
being in the constitution not in the legislature as is the case with admini-
strative agencies.86 As recently as 1971 the Minnesota Supreme Court
passed on the power of the board in Bailey v. University of Minnesota
when it held that even the courts cannot interfere with the board as long
as the board is properly exercising its function.8 7 Of course, any improper
exercise of functions can become subject to court scrutiny.8 8
The latter interpretation was recognized in the state of Nevada.
Although Nevada does not grant constitutional autonomy to the board
of regents the Nevada Supreme Court has concluded that the legislature
has. In State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents of University of
Nevada the board had discharged a faculty member after he acquired
tenure without observing the board's own rules of procedure for hiring
and promoting faculty members.8 9 The court held autonomy did not
imply that excesses of jurisdiction could not be subject to judicial
review. 0 In an earlier decision the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that
the power of the legislature to appropriate funds to the University of
Nevada did not imply that the legislature was given the power to
dictate the use of the funds.9 1 The court said that the appropriation
process was clearly distinct from the control process.92 The court also
refused to allow the legislature to create an advisory board to the
board of regents on the grounds that such legislation would infringe
upon the constitutional prerogative of the regents.9 3
The state of Oklahoma has recently made some constitutional changes
with regard to the board of regents. Oklahoma has a rather elaborate
structure for higher education. Separate boards exist for each state
university, one board for its liberal arts colleges and still another for
its "A & M" colleges. However, all of these boards are subject to a
superior board known as the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Edu-
cation.9 4 The power of this board to dictate policy to the other boards
8183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931).
M236 Minn. 452, 54 N.W.2d 122 (1952).
8290 Minn. 359, 187 N.W.2d 702 (1971).
1Id. at 704.
170 Nev. 144, 261 P.2d 515 (1953).
'OId. at 517.
O'King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533, 200 P.2d 221 (1948).
12Id. at 227.
3Id. at 238.
9 Board of Regents for A&M Colleges of Okla. v. State Regents of Higher Education,
497 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1872).
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throughout the educational system was recently upheld in the case of
Board of Regents for A & M Colleges of Oklahoma v. State Regents of
Higher Education.5 The state board had overruled the "A & M" board
and radically restructured the educational program at one of the A & M
Colleges in the state. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that this
was their constitutional prerogative.9 6 Earlier Oklahoma decisions have
affirmed board decisions to bypass state board of public affairs' approval
of construction contracts, 97 Trapp v. Cook Construction Company as well
as prevented the legislature from directly appropriating funds to specific
institutions or units of the system and by-passing the allocation powers
of the state board.9 8 The United States Supreme Court has even been
involved in judicial review of Oklahoma board actions.9 9 In Pyeatte v.
Board of Regents, the court refused to enjoin the board from enforcing
student housing regulations requiring students to live on campus. 00
In all of the foregoing states, the decisions have consistently upheld
the autonomy of the board when it became involved in disputes with
the legislature and various administrative departments of state gov-
ernment. The rationale behind this consistency is that these states have
conferred constitutional status on the board and have not granted any
constitutional powers over the governance of higher education to legis-
latures and executive departments. However, only a few states have
done this and a majority of states have clearly vested control in other
state departments. 1 1 Rather than review decisions from these juris-
dictions, it is fair to conclude that this distinction exists because the
power over higher education has been clearly delegated to other state
agencies in those states. The courts have been qually consistent in main-
taining that power as their constitutions direct.
Even though the new Montana constitutional provisions represent
a significant change in the control over higher education from that
which existed under the old constitution, some earlier Montana decisions
indicate that even though the legislature had the constitutional power
to prescribe powers and duties of the board of education, nevertheless
once the legislature had acted, the board had some measure of autonomy
and the Montana Supreme Court interpreted these legislative grants
broadly. However, implicit in these decisions is the suggestion that the
legislature could further define and limit these powers.
In the decision of State ex rel. Veeder v. State Board of Education,
the Montana Supreme Court found in legislation granting general powers
0ld.
"Id. at 1069-1070.
"Trapp v. Cook Construction Co., 24 OkIa. 850, 105 P. 667 (1909).
"Board of Regents v. Childres, 197 Okla. 350, 170 P.2d 1018 (1946).
0 Pyeatte v. Board of Regents, 342 U.S. 936 (1953).
1001d.
10 Rept. Ed. Comm., Mont. Const. Cony., supra note 13.
197 Mont. 212, 33 P.2d 516 (1934).
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and duties to the board the intent to vest the board with a substantial
measure of autonomy.10 2 They upheld the board's desire to charge
special student fees for the purpose of debt retirement of building bonds
issued for construction of campus improvements. The court stated:
* . . the members of the board cannot circumscribe the legislative
powers of their successors, but as business managers they may
exercise their powers in the same way and under the same rules
as control a business corporation under like circumstances . . .'
The Montana Supreme Court has also held that the state board of
education, even though subject to the legislature, was nevertheless suf-
ficiently independent to be sued for breach of contract without specific
state consent. 10 4 Regulations of the board have the force and effect
of law. 105 Under the "old" Constitution the Montana Supreme Court,
in interpreting the quantum of power delegated to the board in specific
legislation, has found that legislative grants of authority to the board
carry with them implied powers to do all things necessary and proper
to the general power conferred by the legislature.'0 6 It seems improbable
that a similar rule of construction would not be applied in interpreting
constitutional grants of power.
It should be noted that in those jurisdictions which vest legislative
control over higher education systems, once the legislature grants such
power, the courts of these are inclinded to interpret the grants broadly
and similarly to the rulings of the Montana Supreme Court. In a very
recent decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the Board of Trustees
of the Massachusetts State University system was exempted from a
statute requiring leases of state property to be approved by the state
superintendent of buildings, commissioner of buildings, or the governor,
because the act creating the board conferred powers of governance and
supervision on the board.1'0 7 The Idaho board of regents are exempt
from state nepotism laws. 08 Employees of the Arizona University system
are not subject to the state civil service law. 0 9 The Arizona state auditor
has no discretion over the issuance of warrants for expenditures of state
funds."10 However, later decisions in Arizona have indicated that the
Fairfield decision was not intended to remove all auditing powers of the
state auditor."' In Colorado, the board of regents are not subject to
the Public Utility Commission and do not need to obtain that agency's
approval prior to conducting an intra-system bus service for students. 12
'0Id. at 523.
"'
0 Meens v. State Board of Education, 127 Mont. 515, 267 P.2d 981 (1954).
0State ex rel. Keeney v. Ayers, 108 Mont. 547, 92 P.2d 306 (1939).
'"State ex rel. Veeder v. State Board of Education, aupra note 102. Also see State
ex rel. Dragstedt v. State Board of Education, 103 Mont. 336, 62 P.2d 330 (1936).
107 in re Opinion of Justices to the Governor, ...... Mass -. , 294 N.E.2d 346 (1973).
'16Dreps v. Regents, 65 Ida. 88, 139 P.2d 467 (1943).
1
'gHernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 204 P.2d 854 (1949).
"OFairfield v. W. J. Corbett Hardware Company, 25 Ariz. 199, 215 P. 510 (1923).
'nBoard of Regents v. Frohmiller, 69 Ariz. 50, 208 P.2d 833 (1949).
"'Burnside et al. v. Regents, 100 Colo. 33, 64 P.2d 1271 (1937).
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However, there are certain areas to which even constitutionally
created boards must be subservient. In the general area of social wel-
fare, civil rights and health codes, the courts regard the board as sub-
servient to this type of legislation. Such things as workmen's compen-
sation laws, minimum wage laws, employment security laws, anti-dis-
crimination laws, and the like are binding on systems of higher edu-
cation systems.1
13
PART 5
In conclusion, it seems apparent the Montana, subject only to
executive and legislative audits (audits meaning no pre-audit). It is
entirely free of the usual administrative regulations of other constitu-
tionally inferior state departments. Whether the board of regents desires
to submit its internal operations to these other agencies, is the board's
prerogative, neither the legislature's nor the governor's. The broad grant
of power and responsibility conferred in Article X should not be inter-
preted as entirely precluding the board from electing to secure manage-
ment assistance from other state agencies, but what it clearly means in
light of convention debate and decisions from other jurisdictions operat-
ing systems similar to Montana is that other state agencies or depart-
ments do not have the power to impose their regulations on the board.
It is the board that makes that decision.
A word of caution nevertheless seems appropriate. In other states,
the establishment of these theories has come through litigation which
has not been resolved except by decisions in the highest tribunals of the
state. That possibility cannot be ruled out in Montana. However, with
the vast amount of precedent present, litigating virtually every aspect
of autonomy seems more remote today. As a result of constitutional
independence in the board, many of the statutes passed by the state
legislature in 1971 specifically concerned with the powers and duties of
the board, administrative officers of the units of the University system,
unit academic programs or curricular matters and other enactments of
similar nature are now beyond legislative prerogative and are no longer
necessarily binding on the board. It is the board's prerogative to reaf-
firm, alter, or repeal these legislative enactments as it deems appropriate.
The following list of statutes details exactly which laws are tenta-
tively repealed or altered by the new Constitution, save repromulgation,
as a result of the adoption of the new Constitution.
'See Waldoch, supra note 14 at 93.
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Sec. of R.C.M.: Brief description Effect of new
of subject matter: Constitution:
75-8401 ................................... Purpose of Univ. System ............................. guaranteed
75-8402 (1) ........................... Agri. Exper. Station ...................................... retained
75-8402 (2) (3) (4) (5)...Definitions ....................................................... repealed
75-8403 ................................... Designation of Units...................................... repealed
75-8404 ................................... Right to Use of Name .................................. retained
75-8405 .................................. Purposes of Univ. of M ................................. repealed
75-8406 .................................. Depts. & Courses, UM ................................. repealed
75-8407 (1) ........................... Purpose of Mont. Tech ................................. repealed
75-8407 (2) ........................... Mt. State Bureau of
Mines and Geology ..................................... xetained
75-8408 .................................. Id ...................................................... retained
75-8409 ................................... Director of Bureau .............. r........................ retained
75-8410 ................................... Designation and Purpose of MSU .............. repealed
75-8411 .................................. Agri. Exper. Station ...................................... retained
75-8411 (1-7) ------....... Function of Station ...................................... retained
75-8423 ................................... Eastern Montana College ........................... repealed
75-8424 ................................... Western Montana College ............................ repealed
75-8425 ................................... Donations to Eastern .................................... repealed
75-8426 ................................... Donations to Western .................................... repealed
75-8427 (1) ........................... Acceptance of Pub. Lands ............................ retained
75-8427 (2) .......................... Id ........................................................................ repealed
75-8428 ................................... Northern Montana College ......................... repealed
75-8429 ................................... Authority to accept Gifts for all Units ---- retained
75-8501--8509, in-l .............. Repealed statutory definitions, powers, &
duties of board of education & board of
regents ............................................................
75-8510--8516, incl .............. Local Executive Boards, terms, etc. unit
presidents ...................................................... repealed
75-8601 ................................... Tuition, waiver of nonresident fees ............ repealed
75-8602 ................................... Support of Univ. of M .................................. xetained
75-8603 ................................... Use of funds from sale of products ............ retained
75-8604-8608 ....................... Id. Federal Agri. Funds ............................... retained
75-8609 .........------------------------- Control of expenditures portion dealing
with state purch. agt ................................... repealed
bal .................................................................... retained
75-8610 .................................. Gifts and Donations to system ................... retained
75-8701- 8705 ....................... Students ........................................................... repealed
75-8801-8805 ....................... Research programs ........................................ repealed
75-8901--8905 ....................... Drug and Alcohol Abuse Instruction ......... repealed
The 1973 Montana legislative session passed several acts, some of
which appear to be repetitive of Article IX of the "new" Constitution
and some of which appear to be unconstitutional since they appear to
infringe upon the power of the Board of Regents to govern the univer-
sity system. A listing of these acts is hereinafter set forth. The repetitive
acts are superfluous since they are merely a restatement of language
already contained in Article IX of the "new" Constitution. Presumably,
al such legislation was designed to provide smooth transition during the
changeover from operating under the "old" Constitution to operating
under the new and there was intent to permanently bind the regents to
such enactments.
1 14
liR.C.M. 1947, § 75-5618 as amended (Supp., 1973).
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Sec. of R.C.M.: Brief description Comment:
of subject matter:
75-5609 ............................ Definitions ........................................... Repetitive
75-5610 except 3(C) ..... Compositions of Boards ..................... Unconstitutional
Thereof:
75-5610 (3) (C) ............. Term of Office ..................................... Constitutional
75-5611 ............................ Officer of Commissioner .................... Unconstitutional
75-5612 ............................ Officers of Boards ............................. Unconstitutional
75-5613 ............................ M eetings ................................................ Unconstitutional
75-5614 ............................. -Per Diem and Expenses .................... Unconstitutional
75-5615 ............................. Function of Combined Boards .......... Repetitive
75-5616 .............................. Seal and Record of Proceedings ........ Unconstitutional
75-5617 ............................. Division of Powers .............................. Unconstitutional
as to portions
dealing with Board
of Regents not as
to portions dealing
with State Board of
75-5618 .............................. Retention of Present Education
Members, Transition ........................ Temporary-no longer
75-5619 ............................ Student Member on Board of law as of now
Regents ................................................ Unconstitutional-
invades Governor's
power of appoint-
ment
All other statutes which in any way purport to dictate policy within
the scope of the constitutional powers conferred on the board are like-
wise tentatively repealed pending board action as to their status or con-
tent.
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